Galois ring isomorphism problem by Khathuria, Karan
ar
X
iv
:2
00
8.
11
92
7v
1 
 [c
s.I
T]
  2
7 A
ug
 20
20
Galois ring isomorphism problem
Karan Khathuria
∗
Abstract
Recently, Doröz et al. (2017) proposed a new hard problem, called the finite
field isomorphism problem, and constructed a fully homomorphic encryption scheme
based on this problem. In this paper, we generalize the problem to the case of
Galois rings, resulting in the Galois ring isomorphism problem. The generalization
is achieved by lifting the isomorphism between the corresponding residue fields. As
a result, this generalization allows us to construct cryptographic primitives over the
ring of integers modulo a prime power, instead of a large prime number.
1 Introduction
Finite fields have been studied extensively due to their numerous applications in different
areas of mathematics and computer science, for example, combinatorics, number theory,
design theory, coding theory, cryptography, etc. Finite fields are at the base of the theory
of finite commutative rings. A direct generalization of finite fields is the Galois rings.
The theory of finite fields and Galois rings are parallel and have many similarities. As
a result, it becomes natural to extend and study the applications of finite fields to the
case of Galois rings. Some of the known applications of Galois rings include: public-key
cryptography over residue class rings of integers [5], multisequence shift register synthesis
over Galois rings [1], digital signal processing [9, 8] and algebraic coding theory [6, 3, 11].
In a recent paper [4], Doroz et al. presented some new cryptographic applications
of finite fields, by introducing a new hard problem called the finite field isomorphism
(FFI) problem. Let p be a prime, let Fp be the finite field with p elements, and let φ be
an isomorphism between two distinct extensions of Fp, say X := Fp[x]/(f(x)) and Y :=
Fp[y]/(F (y)). We start from a ‘short’ element a(x) (an element having small coefficients)
in X and consider its image φ(a) in Y. Informally, the decisional FFI problem asks
one to distinguish φ(a) from a random element in Y, without having the knowledge
of the isomorphism φ. Whereas, the computational FFI problem asks one to find the
isomorphism φ, given the representation of Y and some images of short elements. In
the same paper, the authors developed a fully homomorphic encryption scheme based on
the hardness assumption of the FFI problem. Later, in [7], also a signature scheme was
proposed relying on this assumption.
In this work, we generalize the FFI problem to Galois rings. In particular, we define
the Galois ring isomorphism (GRI) problem, that is analogous to the definition of the
FFI problem with X and Y being two distinct isomorphic Galois rings. In this case, the
coefficients of elements in X and Y live in Z/psZ, instead of Z/pZ. The analysis of the
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hardness of the FFI problem can simultaneously be extended to study the hardness of the
GRI problem. Similar to the case of FFI problem, we describe some lattice based attacks
to solve the GRI problem.
With respect to practical applications of the GRI problem, we need efficient algorithms
to construct and use isomorphisms between two Galois rings. This can be achieved
by lifting the isomorphism between the corresponding residue fields. Galois rings are
finite local rings having maximal ideal (p) and residue field Fpn , for some prime integer
p. Therefore, an isomorphism between Galois rings naturally induces an isomorphism
between the corresponding residue fields. Moreover, the isomorphisms between Galois
rings are in one-to-one correspondence with the isomorphisms between the respective
residue fields.
The main advantage of this generalization is that the applications of the FFI problem
can directly be extended to the Galois rings. Hence, we get a fully homomorphic encryp-
tion scheme and a signature scheme over the rings of integers modulo a prime power. This
is an advantage because it is generally more efficient to do operations modulo 264 than
a 64-bit prime. This is because the arithmetic logic units (ALUs) in the CPU perform
arithmetic operations on integer binary numbers, which implies the operations modulo 2s
can be performed trivially whereas operations modulo large prime number involve modu-
lar reductions. Moreover, using the Chinese remainder theorem, we can further generalize
the results over any arbitrary integer modulo ring.
The organization of the paper is as follows. In Section 2, we recall the finite field iso-
morphism problem and discuss its important aspects, namely hardness and construction
of isomorphisms. In Section 3, we define the Galois ring isomorphism problem and we
provide an algorithm to construct Galois ring isomorphism by lifting the isomorphisms
between the corresponding residue fields. Then, in the same section, we discuss the hard-
ness of the GRI problem and describe some lattice based techniques to solve it. In Section
4, we remark about further generalization of the problem by using the Chinese remainder
theorem. Finally, in Section 5, we draw some concluding remarks and discuss further
works.
2 Finite field isomorphism problem
In [4], Doröz et al. proposed an encryption scheme based on a new (computationally)
hard problem, called the finite field isomorphism problem. It relies on the difficulty of
recovering a secret isomorphism between two finite fields.
Let Fp be the finite field with p elements, where p is a prime number. Let f(x) ∈ Fp[x]
and F (y) ∈ Fp[y] be monic irreducible polynomials of degree n. Then X := Fp[x]/(f(x))
and Y := Fp[y]/(F (y)) are isomorphic fields with p
n elements. Let φ be an isomorphism
from X to Y.
We will use the variable x and lower case letters for polynomials in X and the variable
y with upper case letters for polynomials in Y. We will perform reductions mod p into
the interval (−p/2, p/2]. Let χβ be a distribution that produces samples from X having
coefficients bounded between −β and β, given 1 ≤ β ≤ p/2.
Definition 1 (Finite Field Isomorphism Problems (FFI)). Let X,Y, φ, χβ be as before
and let a1(x), . . . , ak(x) be samples from χβ with corresponding images A1(y), . . . , Ak(y)
in Y.
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• The computational FFI problem (CFFI) is: Given Y, A1(y), . . . , Ak(y), recover f(x)
and/or the preimages a1(x), . . . , ak(x).
• The decisional FFI problem (DFFI) is: Given Y, A1(y), . . . , Ak(y) and B1(y), B2(y),
where one ofB1(y), B2(y) is the image of a sample from χβ and the other one is taken
uniformly from Y, distinguish, with a probability greater than 1/2, the element that
was constructed using φ.
The hardness of the FFI problem is based on the following experimental observation.
Observation 2. [4, Observation 1] Let f(x) ∈ Fp[x] and F (y) ∈ Fp[y] be chosen uni-
formly from the set of monic irreducible polynomials of degree n. Let X,Y, φ and χβ be
defined as before. Then the image in Y of a collection of polynomials in X sampled from
χβ is computationally hard to distinguish from a collection of polynomials sampled uni-
formly in Y. By a proper choice of parameters, the ability to distinguish such a collection
can be made arbitrarily hard.
In the same paper, Doröz et al. presented three ways to solve the FFI problem. The
first two are based on lattice reduction algorithms, whereas the third one is based on
solving non-linear polynomial equations.
• Lattice attacks: The isomorphism φ : X→ Y is also an Fp-vector space isomorphism.
Hence, φ−1 can be described by an n× n matrix M , i.e., if φ−1(A(y)) = a(x), then
a = AM where A, a are the coefficient vectors of the polynomials A(y) and a(x),
respectively. By collecting several samples of images of short polynomials in Y, one
gets an instance of a shortest vector problem in a publicly known lattice. In Section
3.2, we describe, in detail, an analogue of this attack for the case of the Galois ring
isomorphism problem.
• Non-linear algebraic attack: The strategy here is to recover the image of x (and
hence the isomorphism φ) by solving a system of high degree multivariate polynomial
equations. Suppose the attacker knows A1(y), A2(y) ∈ Y such that they are images
of the elements a1(x), a2(x) ∈ X sampled from χβ . Then for each i ∈ {1, 2},
Ai(y) = ai(φ(x)) (mod F (y)). By equating the coefficients, the attacker obtains
2n non-linear equations in 3n unknowns (the coefficients of a1(x), a2(x) and φ(x)).
Then the attacker can eliminate the coefficients of φ(x) (e.g. by using Gröbner basis
algorithms) to obtain a system of n non-linear equations in 2n unknowns. Solving
such a system appears to be exponentially difficult.
2.1 Constructing an Isomorphism
For any cryptographic application of the FFI problem, we need to efficiently construct an
isomorphism between finite fields. This can be achieved using Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1 consists of two main steps. Let X := Fp[x]/(f(x)) and Y := Fp[y]/(F (y)),
as in the algorithm. The first step is to compute a root α ∈ Y of f(t) ∈ Y[t], which can
be done using fast polynomial time algorithms, for example, polrootsff routine of Pari-GP
[12]. The second step is to compute the inverse isomorphism by finding β ∈ X which
is a root of F (t) ∈ X[t] and satisfy A(β) − x = 0 in X, where A(y) is the polynomial
representation of α in Y. For more details on Algorithm 1, we refer the interested reader
to [4, Algorithm 1].
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Algorithm 1 Finite field isomorphism construction
Input: monic irreducible polynomials f(x), F (y) of degree n over Fp.
Output: an isomorphism φ : X→ Y, where X := Fp[x]/(f(x)) and Y := Fp[y]/(F (y)).
1: Find a root α ∈ Y of f(t) ∈ Y[t] and define the map φ by setting φ(x) = α. Let A(y)
be the polynomial representation of α in Y.
2: Find β ∈ X such that F (β) = 0 ∈ X and A(β) = x (mod f(x)). This defines the
inverse map φ−1 : Y→ X by setting φ−1(y) = β.
Remark 3. The polynomial f(x) must be chosen independently from the polynomial F (y)
such that knowledge of F (y) does not give any information about f(x). Otherwise, the
attacker may try to gather information about f(x) when she has isomorphic images in Y
of short polynomials in X.
3 Galois ring isomorphism problem
In this section, we generalize the finite field isomorphism problem to the case of Galois
rings. We first recall the definition and properties of Galois rings. We refer to [10] as a
classical reference for the theory of finite rings and to [2, 13] for more detailed reference
for Galois rings.
Definition 4. Let p be a prime number, s and n be positive integers. A Galois ring
GR(ps, n) is a finite commutative unitary local ring of characteristic ps and cardinality
psn.
Proposition 5. [13, Theorem 14.6, Lemma 14.2] Let GR(ps, n) be a Galois ring. Then
1. GR(ps, n) is isomorphic to (Z/psZ) [x]/(f(x)), for any monic polynomial f(x) ∈
(Z/psZ) [x] of degree n whose reduction modulo p is irreducible in (Z/pZ) [x].
2. GR(ps, n) is a local ring with a maximal ideal (p) = pGR(ps, n) and residue field
GR(ps, n)/(p) ∼= Fpn. In particular, we have a homomorphism pi : GR(p
s, n)→ Fpn
given by taking reduction modulo p, whose kernel is (p).
Let X and Y be two (isomorphic) Galois rings of characteristic ps and cardinality psn.
More precisely, let f(x) ∈ (Z/psZ) [x] and F (y) ∈ (Z/psZ) [y] be monic polynomials of
degree n such that they are irreducible modulo p, and define:
X = (Z/psZ) [x]/(f(x)) and Y = (Z/psZ) [y]/(F (y)).
Let φ be an isomorphism between X and Y.
All the reductions we perform will be centered at 0, i.e., reductions mod p belong to
the interval (−p/2, p/2], and reductions mod ps belong to the interval (−ps/2, ps/2]. Let
χβ be a distribution that produces samples from X having coefficients bounded between
−β and β, given 1 ≤ β < ps/2.
Definition 6 (Galois ring isomorphism problems (GRI)). Let X,Y, φ, χβ as before and
let a1(x), . . . , ak(x) be samples from χβ with corresponding images A1(y), . . . , Ak(y) in
Y.
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• The computational GRI problem (CGRI) is: Given Y, A1(y), . . . , Ak(y), recover
f(x) and/or the preimages a1(x), . . . , ak(x).
• The decisional GRI problem (DGRI) is: Given Y, A1(y), . . . , Ak(y) and B1(y),
B2(y), where one of B1(y), B2(y) is the image of a sample from χβ and the other
one is taken uniformly from Y, distinguish, with a probability greater than 1/2, the
element that was constructed using φ.
3.1 Algorithm to construct Galois ring isomorphisms
Let f, F,X,Y be described as above. To construct an isomorphism φ between X and
Y, we lift the isomorphism between their residue fields. In this section, we will use the
notation α (resp. f(x)) to denote α (mod p) (resp. f(x) (mod p)) for any α ∈ Z/psZ
(resp. f(x) ∈ Z/psZ[x]).
Let φ be an isomorphism between X and Y, and let piX : X → Fp[x]/
(
f(x)
)
and
piY : Y → Fp[y]/
(
F (Y )
)
be homomorphims given by reduction modulo p. Then we
obtain the following commutative diagram:
X = (Z/psZ)[x]/(f(x)) Y = (Z/psZ)[y]/(F (y))
Fp[x]/
(
f(x)
)
Fp[y]/
(
F (y)
)
φ
piX piY
φ
Since φ is an isomorphism, the induced map φ is a field isomorphism. Conversely, given
an isomorphism φ : Fp[x]/
(
f(x)
)
→ Fp[y]/
(
F (y)
)
, there exists a unique isomorphism
φ : X → Y that induces φ, see [2, Theorem 5.1.4]. The construction and uniqueness
of φ follows from the following proposition, which is a special case of [13, Lemma 14.5].
We provide the proof because it proves the correctness of Algorithm 2 that describes the
construction of φ.
Proposition 7. [13, Lemma 14.5] Let R = GR(ps, n) be a Galois ring and consider the
homomorphism pi : R → R/(p). Let f(x) be a degree n monic polynomial over Z/psZ
such that f(x) is irreducible over Z/pZ. Further, let α be a root of f(x) in R/(p). Then
there exists a unique root β ∈ R of f(x) such that pi(β) = α.
Proof. First note that f(x) has degree n because f(x) is monic. Thus, R/(p) ∼= Fpn and
f(x) has n distinct roots in R/(p). This implies that α exists and it is a simple root of
f(x).
Let α ∈ R be the trivial lift of α. We construct a sequence β0, β1, . . . , βs−1 ∈ R as
follows:
β0 = α,
βi+1 = βi − (f
′(βi))
−1
f(βi) for i = 0, . . . , s− 2.
We will show that βs−1 is a root of f(x) and pi(βs−1) = α.
We first show that pi(βi) = α for i = 0, 1, . . . , s − 1. Clearly, pi(β0) = pi(α) = α.
Now, let i ≥ 1 and assume pi(βi−1) = α. Since α is a simple root of f(x), we have that
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pi(f ′(βi−1)) = f ′(α) =
(
f
)′
(α) 6= 0. Hence, f ′(βi−1) is a unit of R. Thus,
pi(βi) = pi(βi−1)− pi
(
(f ′(βi−1))
−1
)
pi(f(βi−1))
= α− pi
(
(f ′(βi−1))
−1
)
f(α)
= α.
Now, we show that f(βi) ∈ (p
i+1) for all i = 0, 1, . . . , s− 1. Clearly, since pi(f(β0)) =
f(α) = 0, we get f(β0) ∈ (p). Now, let i ≥ 1 and assume that f(βi−1) ∈ (p
i). Then by
Taylor’s formula1 we have
f(βi) = f
(
βi−1 − f
′(βi−1)
−1f(βi−1)
)
= f(βi−1) +
f ′(βi−1)
1!
(
−f ′(βi−1)
−1f(βi−1)
)
+
f ′′(βi−1)
2!
(
−f ′(βi−1)
−1f(βi−1)
)2
+ · · ·
+
f (n)(βi−1)
n!
(
−f ′(βi−1)
−1f(βi−1)
)n
=
f ′′(βi−1)
2!
(
−f ′(βi−1)
−1f(βi−1)
)2
+ · · ·
+
f (n)(βi−1)
n!
(
−f ′(βi−1)
−1f(βi−1)
)n
∈ (pi+1)
Thus, by induction, we have βs−1 ∈ R such that pi(βs−1) = α and f(βs−1) ∈ (p
s) = (0).
Thus we found a root β := βs−1 ∈ R of f(x) with pi(β) = α.
To prove uniqueness, we first write f(x) = (x − β)g(x), for some g(x) ∈ R. Observe
that g(α) 6= 0, as α is a simple root of f(x). Let β′ be another root of f(x) in R such
that pi(β′) = α. Then we have
0 = f(β′) = (β′ − β)g(β′).
Moreover, pi(g(β′)) = g(α) 6= 0, which implies g(β′) is a unit of R and hence β′ = β.
3.2 On the hardness of the Galois ring isomorphism problem
Clearly, the Galois ring isomorphism (GRI) problem is a generalization of the finite field
isomophism (FFI) problem. Hence, it follows that the GRI problem is as hard as the
1Let S be a ring and f(x) = anxn + · · ·+ a0 ∈ S[x]. Then the Taylor’s formula is given by
f(x+ a) = f(x) +
f ′(x)
1!
a+
f ′′(x)
2!
a2 + · · ·+
f(n)(x)
n!
an, where
f ′(x) = nanx
n−1 + (n− 1)an−1x
n−2 + · · ·+ a1,
f(m)(x) =
(
f(m−1)(x)
)
′
for m ≥ 2.
We note that the Taylor’s formula is well-defined as k! divides each coefficient of f(k)(x) for all k ∈
{2, . . . , n}.
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Algorithm 2 Galois ring isomorphism construction
Input: f(x) ∈ (Z/psZ) [x] and F (y) ∈ (Z/psZ) [y] monic polynomials of degree n such
that they are irreducible modulo p.
Output: an isomorphism φ : X→ Y, where X := (Z/psZ)[x]/(f(x)) and
Y := (Z/psZ)[y]/(F (y)).
1: Compute f(x) and F (y), reductions of f(x) and F (y), respectively, modulo p.
2: Construct an isomorphism φ : Fp[x]/
(
f(x)
)
→ Fp[y]/
(
F (y)
)
using Algorithm 1 with
input polynomials f(x) and F (y). Let α be the image of x under φ, i.e., f (α) = 0 ∈
Fp[y]/
(
F (y)
)
.
3: Define β0 := α ∈ Y, where α is the trivial lift of α.
4: for i = 0, . . . , s− 2 do
5: define βi+1 := βi − (f
′(βi))
−1
f(βi) ∈ Y
6: Define the isomorphism φ by setting φ(x) = βs−1.
FFI problem in the sense that a polynomial time algorithm that solves the GRI problem
would also solve the FFI problem.
In some special cases, the GRI problem canonically reduces to the FFI problem.
In particular, reduction to FFI problem is possible when β < p/2. Let X,Y, φ, χβ ,
a1(x), . . . , ak(x), A1(y), . . . , Ak(y) be as in Definition 6. By taking reduction modulo
p, we obtain an instance of the FFI problem. Let piX : X → X := Fp[x]/(f(x)) and
piY : Y → Y := Fp[y]/(F (y)) be the homomorphisms given by taking reduction modulo
p. Then for all i ∈ {1, . . . , k} we have piX(ai(x)) = ai(x) = ai(x), as the coefficients of
ai’s belong to (−β, β]. This gives an instance of the FFI problem with input X,Y, χ
′
β ,
piX(a1(x)), . . . , piX(ak(x)), piY(A1(y)), . . . , piY(Ak(y)), where χ
′
β is a distribution on X that
produces samples whose coefficients are bounded between −β and β.
In general if β is not less than p/2, then the GRI problem does not directly reduces
to the FFI problem. However, we can generalize the techniques of solving FFI problem
to solve the GRI problem.
3.2.1 Solving the GRI problem using lattice reduction algorithms
In [4], Doröz et al. provided two ways to solve the FFI problem using lattice reduction
techniques. In the following, we extend these techniques to solve the GRI problem.
Let X,Y, φχβ , a(x), A(y) be as in the Definition 6. We first note that φ (and equiva-
lently φ−1) is also a Z/psZ-module homomorphism, because φ is given by
∑n−1
i=0 aix
i 7→∑n−1
i=0 aiφ(x)
i (mod F (y)).
We identify a polynomial a(x) with the coefficients vector a = (a0, . . . , an−1). Then
the map φ can be described by using an n × n matrix over Z/psZ. Let, for each i ∈
{0, . . . , n− 1},
φ(x)i :=
n−1∑
j=0
mi,jy
j ∈ Y,
for some mi,j ∈ Z/p
s
Z. Let M = (mi,j) be the corresponding matrix. Then, A(y) =
a(φ(x)) (mod F (y)) implies that A = aM over Z/psZ. Moreover, the matrix M is
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invertible, as there exists an n×n matrix N = (ni,j) ∈ (Z/p
s
Z)
n×n
, corresponding to φ−1
with respect to bases {1, x, . . . , xn−1} and {1, y, . . . , yn−1}, such that NM = MN = In.
Using this vector/matrix correspondence, we can extend the two lattice attacks pre-
sented in [4] to our case. In the following, we describe one of the attacks in which the
corresponding lattice has dimension nearly 2n.
Let A1, . . . , Ak be the known vectors and a1, . . . , ak be the unknown vectors, corre-
sponding to the polynomials A1(y), . . . , Ak(y) and a1(x), . . . , ak(x), respectively. Then
the unknown vectors a1 = A1N, . . . , ak = AkN are small, i.e., the absolute value of the
entries is bounded by β. We consider a single coordinate of these vectors, let N⊺j be the
j-th column of the matrix N and let
bj := (A1N
⊺
j , A2N
⊺
j , . . . , AkN
⊺
j ).
Now, define the matrices
P := (A⊺1 |A
⊺
2 | · · · |A
⊺
k), Q := (a
⊺
1 |a
⊺
2 | · · · |a
⊺
k),
and set
D =
(
P
psIk
)
.
The matrices P and Q are of dimension n× k with entries from Z/psZ, the matrix D
has dimension (n+ k)× k and bj is the vector consisting of the j-th coordinates of ai’s.
Let L(D) be the lattice generated by the rows of D, so it has dimension k and it
contains the short row vector bj. If k is chosen sufficiently large, then the vectors bj
will be short relative to the Gaussian heuristic. As a result, such vectors (or a linear
combination of them) can be recovered using lattice reduction algorithms.
4 Notes on further generalizations
It is possible to further generalize the FFI problem in many different ways. In the most
general sense, we can define isomorphism between arbitrary finite commutative rings.
Every finite commutative ring is a direct sum of finitely many finite local rings, see [2,
Theorem 3.1.4]. Moreover, each of these finite local rings is a homomorphic image of a
polynomial ring over a Galois ring, see [2, Theorem 6.3.1]. This implies that an isomor-
phism between finite rings can be obtained by constructing an isomorphism between the
direct summands.
For more practical purposes, we may restrict ourselves to the case of finite rings
that are direct sums of Galois rings. Let R1, . . . , Rk be Galois rings given by Ri =
(Z/psii Z) [x]/(fi(x)) for each i ∈ {1, . . . , k}, where p1, . . . , pk are distinct primes and for
each i ∈ {1, . . . , k}, fi(x) is a monic polynomial of degree n whose reduction modulo pi
is irreducible in (Z/psii Z) [x]. Let R = R1 ⊕ · · · ⊕Rk, i.e.,
R = Z[x]/(ps11 , f1(x))⊕ · · · ⊕ Z[x]/(p
sk
k , fk(x)).
Since the ideals (psii , fi(x)) and (p
sj
j , fj(x)) are co-maximal for all i 6= j, we can apply
the Chinese remainder theorem to obtain the ring isomorphism
R ∼= Z[x]/I,
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where I =
∏k
i=1(p
si
i , fi(x)). One can check that I = (m, f(x)), where m = p
s1
1 · · · p
sk
k
and f(x) is a monic polynomial of degree n such that f(x) ≡ fi(x) (mod p
si
i ) for each
i ∈ {1, . . . , k}. The polynomial f(x) is unique modulom, and can be obtained by applying
the Chinese remainder theorem (over Z/mZ) for each coefficient of f(x). This implies
that
R ∼= (Z/mZ) /(f(x)),
for a polynomial f(x) that is irreducible modulo pi for each i ∈ {1, . . . , k}. Hence,
the isomorphisms between such rings can be constructed by constructing isomorphisms
between each Galois ring component and then applying the Chinese remainder theorem.
Consequently, we can extend the definition of isomorphism problem for such finite rings.
Moreover, all the operations to construct an isomorphism are efficient and can be used
for practical purposes.
5 Conclusion
In this paper, we generalize the finite field isomorphism (FFI) problem to Galois rings,
and define the Galois ring isomorphism (GRI) problem. We observe that, as in the case of
the FFI problem, the best known techniques for solving the GRI problem is based on the
lattice reduction algorithms. We show that the construction of a Galois ring isomorphism
can efficiently be done by constructively lifting the isomorphism between corresponding
residue fields.
In [4] and [7], we have seen two applications of the FFI problem, namely, a fully
homomorphic encryption scheme and a signature scheme, respectively. As a result of the
generalization, we note that both the applications can be extended to the case of Galois
rings (or more generally to the case of direct products of Galois rings). Consequently, we
obtain the same cryptographic primitives over integer modulo rings. One major advantage
of working over integer ring modulo 2s is the efficiency of the cryptographic protocols:
performing operations modulo 2s on CPUs are way better than modulo an s-bit large
prime number.
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